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FISCAL PRESSURES, THE GREAT 
RECESSION, AND MONETARY 
SANCTIONS IN WASHINGTON COURTS 
OF LIMITED JURISDICTION
Frank Edwards
Abstract
Many municipal governments have come to depend heavily on 
fines and fees generated by the criminal justice system.  This essay uses 
data from all courts of limited jurisdiction (municipal and district courts) 
in Washington State between 2000 and 2014 to evaluate the relationships 
between local government finances, the Great Recession, and the imposi-
tion of debt through the criminal justice system.  I find that municipalities 
issued more criminal justice debt during and after the recession across 
Washington, but that government finances as measured by tax receipts 
and expenditures per capita were weakly related to sentencing practices. 
These findings suggest that macroeconomic fiscal pressures may be driv-
ers of enforcement and prosecutorial practices through increasing case 
volumes, but that macroeconomic pressures and local fiscal pressures did 
not appear to shift court sentencing practices in Washington during the 
Great Recession.
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Introduction
When the Department of Justice investigated the Ferguson Police 
Department following the killing of Michael Brown, it found that the 
municipality had turned the criminal justice system into an engine of 
revenue generation.1  Many local and county governments around the 
country derive a substantial share of their revenues from criminal jus-
tice and the courts, but our understanding of this process is limited by 
the availability of high-quality data.2  In this study, I use comprehensive 
administrative data from all courts of limited jurisdiction in Washington 
State to evaluate how local government budgets relate to the sentencing 
of legal debt through the criminal justice system.  I also evaluate wheth-
er sentencing and enforcement behaviors shifted during and after the 
Great Recession.
Courts of limited jurisdiction in Washington handle a variety of or-
dinance violations, traffic infractions, and misdemeanors.  They include 
municipal courts, which hear violations of city ordinances, and coun-
ty-level district courts, which hear nonfelony criminal and traffic cases. 
Washington municipalities and counties have flexibility in attaching fines 
and fees to violations of municipal or county law.  The total revenue they 
can capture from these sources is governed by state law.  District and mu-
nicipal courts are tasked with collecting “all fees, costs, fines, forfeitures 
and other money imposed by any municipal court for the violation of any 
municipal or town ordinances”.   Of these collections, 32 percent of nonin-
terest revenues are owed to the state.3  In general, local governments are 
allowed to retain the remaining 68 percent, with the exception of some 
costs imposed by the state.
Given the flexibility to impose fines and fees, and the capacity to 
retain a majority of collected fines and fees at the local level, the Revised 
Code of Washington provides municipal and county governments with 
direct financial incentives to issue and collect debt through the criminal 
justice system.  In this study, I use administrative court data to evaluate 
the following questions:
• Do fiscal pressures lead cities/counties to initiate more cases?
• Do fiscal pressures lead courts to issue higher financial penalties?
• Are these behaviors more likely in cities/counties with larger 
non-white populations?
• Did court behavior change during the Great Recession (2008–
2010)?
1. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department (2015).
2. April D. Fernandes et al., Monetary Sanctions: A Review of Revenue Generation, 
Legal Challenges, and Reform, 15 Ann. Rev. L. and Soc. Science 397 (2019); Ka-
sey Henricks & Daina Cheyenne Harvey, Not One But Many: Monetary Pun-
ishment and the Fergusons of America, 32 Soc. F. 930 (2017); Michael W. Sances 
& Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government?  Descriptive Representation and 
Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. Pol. 1090 (2017).
3. RCW 3.50.100, RCW 3.62.020.
159Fiscal Pressures, the Great recession, and Monetary sanctions
I. Data and Methods
I use case-level records on all criminal cases filed in courts of limit-
ed jurisdiction in Washington State between 2000 and 2014.  Data from 
the Washington Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) includes 
data from 61 district courts and 109 municipal courts across the state.  It 
includes all courts, except the Seattle Municipal Court, which collects its 
own data.  I attach this data to data provided by the Seattle Municipal 
Court for the same period: 2000 to 2014.  I focus only on those cases 
where a fine, fee, cost, or other nonrestitution legal financial obligation 
(LFO) was imposed.  These data record 1.6 million traffic misdemeanors 
with LFOs, 1.3 million nontraffic misdemeanors, 5.6 million traffic infrac-
tions, and 0.3 million nontraffic infractions.
Figure 1: Municipal and District Court Cases in WA
From these data, I construct three place-level measures by type of 
case: misdemeanors (traffic/nontraffic) and infractions (traffic/nontraffic). 
I group all cases with LFOs of each type at the place-level, then calcu-
late the total number of cases per resident, the total imposed LFO debt 
per resident, and the average LFO debt imposed per case.  These three 
measures capture the breadth of court contact across the population, the 
fiscal intensity of that contact, and the average penalty in a single case.
Focal predictors are obtained from the Annual Survey of State and 
Local Government Finance and the U.S. Census.  Local government–level 
financial data used in this analysis include per capita tax receipts and per 
capita government expenditures.  Tax receipts provide a key measure of 
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government own-source revenue.  Paired with expenses, these measures 
provide a simple and direct indicator of fiscal strain.  I pair municipal 
financial data with that city’s municipal court and pair county financial 
data with that county’s district court(s).  All budget and LFO data are 
inflation-adjusted to 2018 dollars.
I use the 2000 and 2010 US Census to provide city and county-level 
population estimates for the total population, the Latinx population, the 
American Indian/Alaska Native population, and the Black population 
size.  I use a linear interpolation to estimate population between 2000 
and 2014, using the decennial Census data from 2000 and 2010.  Note 
that this approach understates uncertainty in population change within 
these cities and counties during this period.  As such, regression param-
eters for population characteristics should be interpreted with caution.
II. Findings
Figure 1 displays the trajectory of case volume, fine and fee volume, 
and average LFO sentence over time by case type.  Note that the dashed 
vertical lines indicate the period of the Great Recession.  The top row of 
the figure summarizes changes in district court LFO cases between 2000 
and 2014, and the bottom row summarizes municipal court LFO cases.  In 
the leftmost column, I show shifts in case volume over this time window, 
adjusted for population size across Washington state.
Between 2000 and 2014, the number of traffic infraction cases filed 
in both district and municipal courts increased dramatically, while other 
categories of cases remained relatively stable.  In 2000, there were about 
33 traffic infraction cases filed across all Washington Municipal courts per 
1000 state residents.  In 2014, that number had more than doubled to 69.3 
cases per 1000 state residents.  For district courts, the change is more dra-
matic.  In 2000, district courts handled about 1.1 traffic infraction cases 
per 1000 state residents.  By 2014, this rate had increased 36-fold, to 41.4 
cases per 1000 state residents.  In municipal courts, rates at which other 
case types were filed remained relatively stable.  In district courts, I ob-
serve increases in the rates at which criminal traffic and nontraffic cases 
were filed over this period.  Note that for both district and municipal 
courts, per capita traffic infraction rates increased substantially during 
the recession years.
The middle column displays total LFOs ordered across all munic-
ipal and district court cases in the state per 1000 residents.  For district 
courts, there are clear increases in the volume of LFO debt issued per 
capita over the 2000 to 2014 period across all violation categories.  In 
2000, Washington district courts ordered about 41 cents per 1000 resi-
dents in traffic infraction LFOs.  In 2014, they ordered about $8.55 per 
1000 residents.  Per capita LFO orders remained relatively stable in mu-
nicipal courts, increasing from about $14.55 per 1000 residents in 2000 to 
about $19.92 per 1000 residents in 2014.
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The righthand column of Figure 1 shows the average total LFO im-
posed per case across municipal and district courts in Washington.  While 
the average total LFO debt ordered per case for misdemeanors in district 
courts increased over this period, I note declines in the per-case average 
LFO imposed for traffic infractions.  Given the sharp increase in LFOs 
ordered per capita and cases per capita, this strongly suggests that the 
increase is driven by changes in policing and enforcement, with higher 
case volumes driving increased rates of LFO sentencing.
III. Statistical Models
To explore how the Recession, local government budgets, and racial 
and ethnic population composition relate to the imposition of court debt 
in Washington, I construct a series of regression models.
For municipalities and counties separately, I estimate multilev-
el models for total LFO debt and debt ordered per case that include 
court-specific and year-specific varying intercepts.  Model predictors 
include parameters for local government expenses per capita, local gov-
ernment tax revenues per capita, the square root of the proportion of the 
population that is Latinx, American Indian/Alaska Native (AIAN), and 
Black (separately), the log of the total, and an indicator for whether the 
observation occurs during the 2008 to 2010 Recession years.
Figure 2: Predicted LFO Cases per Capita
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IV. Model Results
Figure 2 displays the results of regression model predictions for 
a set of hypothetical cases where we hold all predictors at their mean 
and systematically vary tax revenues per capita from 0.5 dollars per 
capita to 2 dollars per capita.  Note that in the district and municipal 
court models, the coefficient for tax revenues per capita is not statis-
tically significant, and there is no clear bivariate association between 
tax receipts and LFO cases per capita.  These models suggest that case 
volumes are not significantly different in high tax receipt jurisdictions 
when compared to low tax receipt jurisdictions.  Washington courts of 
limited jurisdiction initiated more cases with LFOs on average during 
and after the recession than they did before the recession.  The models 
predict the highest volume of cases in the years following the reces-
sion, with significant increases during the recession years.  These results 
suggest, along with the time series displayed in Figure 1, that shifts in 
enforcement and court practices leading to higher case volumes likely 
began during or immediately before the recession, and have continued 
to drive up case volumes since.
Figure 3 displays the model-predicted average total debt assessed 
by Washington courts of limited jurisdiction per case by case type.   In-
creases in total LFOs during and after the recession in Washington State 
courts of limited jurisdiction were largely a function of increased case 
volume, not increased sentencing in court.  In both Municipal Courts and 
District Courts during and after the recession, the number of cases com-
ing into the court increased, but the average amount ordered remained 
relatively stable.  For most classes of offenses, the average sentenced 
amount slightly decreased between 2005 and 2013, and remained stable 
during the recession.  This suggests that shifts in debt issued during and 
after the recession are likely due to shifting enforcement and prosecu-
tion, not due to court practices.
Contrary to a fiscal pressure theory, we see higher levels of sen-
tenced LFO debt in high property tax receipt jurisdiction district courts 
(county).  We see no clear relationship between property tax revenues 
and municipal court practices.  These results provide no support for a 
microlevel fiscal pressure theory of LFO sentencing at the court level.
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Figure 3: Predicted Average LFO Ordered
Conclusion
This study provides an overview of the issuance of criminal justice 
debt for misdemeanors and infractions across Washington state courts of 
limited jurisdiction.  I show that district and municipal courts in Wash-
ington began issuing much higher volumes of traffic infraction debt 
during and after the Great Recession, but this was largely a function of 
a higher volume of cases.  Average LFOs ordered per case have declined 
over time.  I do not find a clear relationship between local government 
finances (as measured by property tax revenues) and the issuance of 
low-level criminal justice debt in Washington.  This suggests that courts 
in Washington may not be sensitive to fiscal pressures from their host 
local governments, despite clear financial incentives for increased collec-
tions.  Prior research has clearly indicated, however, that court clerks in 
Washington do feel fiscal pressure to increase collections given strains on 
the courts’ own budgets.4
Based on these findings, the relationship between local government 
budgets and criminal justice debt collections are either weak or more 
complex than the current model evaluated here.  These results showed 
that the total amount of debt issued by courts increased during and after 
the recession, but average debt issued per case remained stable over 
time.  This strongly suggests that inflows of cases drove these changes. 
4. Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for 
the Poor (2016).
164 2020:157C J LR
Policing, traffic enforcement, and prosecutorial decisionmaking are likely 
the drivers of these shifts.  Fiscal pressures may indeed by shaping the 
broader system of legal debt, but it appears that the courts themselves 
were not the primary institution responsible for changes during and after 
the recession.  Future research should closely examine how police en-
forcement patterns and prosecutorial decision shifted during and after 
the recession, and examine whether local government fiscal pressures af-
fect police practices.
These results suggest that in Washington, courts of limited juris-
diction do not appear to dramatically shift their sentencing practices in 
response to macroeconomic shocks or pressures on municipal budgets. 
The volumes of legal debt issued in Washington changed dramatically 
during and after the recession, but the courts themselves do not appear 
to have been the primary source of this change.  Instead, research-
ers and advocates should take a holistic view of the legal systems that 
produce criminal debt, including police, prosecutors, and commercial 
interests, to better map the relationships between fiscal pressures and 
 criminal-legal debt.
